HTTP headers/TLS padding as a censorship circumvention method

Some time ago I had an idea: how DPI would handle uncommonly large amount of HTTP header data, if the Host header is in the end of all other headers? How large reassembly buffer do DPI systems usually have?
SKAT DPI developer from VAS Experts told me they have 8 KiB buffer, and I decided to check whether HTTP header padding could be used as a DPI circumvention method and how well do websites handle it.

Let’s see the size of HTTP header buffer of common web servers.


Nginx has 32KiB overall buffer, each header line can’t be longer than 8KiB.

Default: large_client_header_buffers 4 8k;

Sets the maximum number and size of buffers used for reading large client request header. A request line cannot exceed the size of one buffer, or the 414 (Request-URI Too Large) error is returned to the client. A request header field cannot exceed the size of one buffer as well, or the 400 (Bad Request) error is returned to the client. Buffers are allocated only on demand. By default, the buffer size is equal to 8K bytes. If after the end of request processing a connection is transitioned into the keep-alive state, these buffers are released.

Apache httpd

Httpd has 8190 bytes limit for each header and no(?) overall limit.

Default: LimitRequestFieldSize 8190

This directive specifies the number of bytes that will be allowed in an HTTP request header.


According to, IIS 6 has 16 KiB limit for each header.


According to, Tomcat 7 has 8190 overall limit.

Testing top 10000 sites

I decided to perform test on Alexa top 10000 websites and see which would stop working correctly with 14k and 18k padding data.

Common CURL HTTP request
Just a regular curl HTTP request without padding, but with browser’s User-Agent and proper Accept header.
curl --max-time 15 -s -I -X GET --compressed -H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0" -H "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8" "1"

   8456 3xx
    805 2xx
    164 4xx
     53 5xx

Total HTTP responses: 9478 

14 KB of padding data
Now curl request has 14 additional X-Padding headers with 1KB a's as a value.

AAAS="$(head -c 1000 < /dev/zero | tr '\0' 'a')"

curl --max-time 15 -s -I -X GET --compressed \
 -H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0" \
 -H "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8" \
 -H "X-Padding01: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding02: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding03: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding04: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding05: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding06: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding07: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding08: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding09: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding10: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding11: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding12: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding13: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding14: $AAAS" \
   8159 3xx
    732 2xx
    476 4xx
     66 5xx

Total HTTP responses: 9433 

As we can see, with 14k padding data 3.4% websites started to return either 5xx or 4xx error code compared to non-padded request.

18 KB of padding data
The request is the same, with additional lines compared to 14k request:

 -H "X-Padding15: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding16: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding17: $AAAS" \
 -H "X-Padding18: $AAAS" \
   7029 3xx
   1732 4xx
    590 2xx
     68 5xx

Total HTTP responses: 9419

Going beyond 16KiB limit breaks a lot of websites: about 16.8% servers responded with either 4xx or 5xx error codes, compared to stock curl request.


This method could be used in some cases, either with DPI systems with less than 16 KiB reassembly buffer or with some websites/web servers with lax configuration.

The scripts I used: http-padding-test.7z (5.3 MB)

Note: this test did not move Host header after the padding. This is relevant only for censorship circumvention and not relevant to check how much data does web server accept. This was not done on purpose, I just forgot about that.

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TLS Padding Extension

We can apply the same principle for HTTPS data, using TLS Padding Extension. This extension was introduced as a workaround of F5 SSLv3/TLS code, which incorrectly handled ClientHello packets between 256 byte and 512 byte size.

Padding extension allows to include up to 16 KiB of null-byte padding data in TLS ClientHello packet.

To perform this test, I’ve patched OpenSSL to include ~12KB of padding data to each ClientHello packet and to move Server Name Indication extension to the end of the packet, after padding. Did not forget it this time. I tested only TLS connection establishment, with certificate validation. Did not test underlying protocol (HTTP request).

The padded handshake looks as follows:

Transport Layer Security
    TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
        Content Type: Handshake (22)
        Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
        Length: 12305
        Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
            Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
            Length: 12301
            Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
            Random: 054d101ad3fec689ea2363fb609e801275b87e34739e47a3…
            Session ID Length: 32
            Session ID: 97aca2269676ac73eddf51a17bd85d8fef30bb74bda63339…
            Cipher Suites Length: 62
            Cipher Suites (31 suites)
            Compression Methods Length: 1
            Compression Methods (1 method)
            Extensions Length: 12166
            Extension: ec_point_formats (len=4)
            Extension: supported_groups (len=12)
            Extension: session_ticket (len=0)
            Extension: encrypt_then_mac (len=0)
            Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0)
            Extension: signature_algorithms (len=48)
            Extension: supported_versions (len=9)
            Extension: psk_key_exchange_modes (len=2)
            Extension: key_share (len=38)
            Extension: padding (len=11996)    ← almost 12 KB
            Extension: server_name (len=13)   ← SNI here

The command used to check common HTTPS request is:
timeout 15 openssl s_client -host "$1" -port 443 -servername "$1" -bugs < /dev/null &> /dev/null

And for padded request patched OpenSSL was used:
timeout 15 ./openssl s_client -host "$1" -port 443 -servername "$1" -bugs -nosni_first -add_sni_after_padding < /dev/null &> /dev/null

Which produced the following result:

   8889 OK
   1111 FAIL

And for padded handshake:

   8800 OK
   1200 FAIL

Large TLS Padding Extension may disrupt only about 0.9% of top web sites.


This method could be used in most cases and is compatible with large amount of CDNs, web servers and encryption stacks, but still may break some websites.

https-padding-test.7z (105.7 KB)
OpenSSL patches included.

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Turns out this could be used to perform denial of service attacks over cloud proxy services.

I think we’re dealing with the first victims. And it doesn’t seem like a coincidence.