Насколько мне известно - нет, у них просто белый список адресов. В таком случае то, что описано в статье ещё хуже, и уже больше походит (как бы это смешно или печально не звучало) на Сев. Корею с её интранетом.
Upd. относительно недавно была новость как раз об этом - Роскомнадзор планирует создать в России свой аналог RIPE NCC
At some point in the next decade, the Chinese government, with the support of Russia and other authoritarian regimes, will move forward with plans to establish a separate root system for their share of the internet. When the split happens, we will mark it as the end of the global internet era. When the history of that event is written, we will identify a series of seminal events in 2019 that were harbingers of what was to come.
Long a point of contention, control of the root, the top-level system for resolving requests for web addresses, has been hotly debated within internet governance circles. The Obama administration moved forward with long-stalled plans to devolve control of the root from the U.S. Department of Commerce to ICANN as an independent organization with the goal of placing the internet firmly in the hands of the private sector and out of the realm of great power politics (full disclosure: I had a hand in making that decision). For its part, ICANN has worked to placate the Chinese by establishing more instances of root servers in the country.
Unfortunately, these efforts have done little to slow Chinese ambitions to break from the global internet. The reason is simple–a global internet that is open and free is not compatible with a Chinese state that views openness and freedom as a threat to its stability.
When the Chinese government takes this step in the next year or decade, it will be careful to emphasize that it did so in the interest of “stability” for the internet, playing on both the technical and Orwellian meaning of the word. Redundancy, or alternate instances of network infrastructure, it will argue, is a good and necessary step, given the importance of internet communications to modern life.
For a long time, maybe months, maybe years, the Chinese-controlled system will simply replicate the root zone file from the ICANN controlled root, providing the exact same name resolution as the domain name system that ICANN manages. But then one day, amid escalating geopolitical tensions, China will drop the .tw routing information from its server, and, with a few keystrokes, drop Taiwan off the internet for half the world’s population.
What China will have done is what they always feared the United States would do: use its control of the internet root as a geopolitical weapon. Soon after, the Chinese government will use its newfound power to pressure other countries and companies to censor themselves or risk being similarly blackholed.
When this happens, it should come as a surprise to no one paying attention today. 2019 was the year that China’s intention to use the internet as the backbone of its surveillance state came into clear focus. While perfecting that model at home, China has also been busy exporting it to other authoritarian regimes. According to Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization, through its state-owned enterprises and other closely aligned companies, China has begun to help at least eighteen countries that are in the process of constructing such networks.
https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FII_Internet_Fragmentation_An_Overview_2016.pdf
Preface
The World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2015 in Davos-Klosters included
a session entitled, Keeping “Worldwide” in the Web. Participants discussed a
number of challenges facing the open global Internet, which has become a
key driver of global wealth creation, socio-cultural enrichment and human
empowerment in recent decades. Among the top concerns raised was the
emerging fragmentation of the Internet along multiple lines due to
developments in the technical, governmental and commercial realms. In the
months to follow, it became clear that while this fragmentation was of growing
concern to many close observers of and participants in the global Internet
ecosystem, there was no widespread consensus as to its nature and scope.
As such, with the launch of the World Economic Forum’s multi-year Future of
the Internet Initiative (FII), Internet fragmentation stood out as one of the
priority topics meriting exploration in the context of the FII’s Governance on
the Internet project.
To facilitate the discussion, the Forum invited William J. Drake, who had been
a discussion leader at the Annual Meeting session, to organize a small team
of experts that could produce a background paper on the subject. This team
included Vinton Cerf, widely regarded as a “father of the Internet”, and
Wolfgang Kleinwächter, a leading figure in global Internet governance
institutions. The team’s mandate was to contribute to the emergence of a
common baseline understanding of Internet fragmentation by undertaking a
horizontal mapping of the issues and dynamics involved. That is, its intended
value-added would be in presenting a big picture overview of a range of
examples illustrating the trend towards fragmentation, rather than in offering
finely detailed portraits of any of them.
From the outset of the process, the World Economic Forum engaged a
number of interested participants in the FII’s Core Community, as well as a
group of external experts. The research in progress was discussed both at
meetings held in Geneva and New York and on conference calls to engage in
dialogue and gather feedback, and over a dozen written replies to the draft
version were received as well. All these inputs were taken into consideration
by the team of authors. Ultimately though, the views expressed in the paper
are solely those of the authors working in their individual capacities, and not
necessarily those of their respective organizations, or of the World Economic
Forum itself or its Members or Partners.
I would like to thank the authors for their intellectual leadership in developing
this analysis, which is an important, new resource for everyone concerned
about the evolution of the Internet. I would also like to express appreciation to
the informal multistakeholder group of experts who reviewed earlier drafts and
provided comments to the authors. The Forum particularly wishes to
recognize the leadership and support of the trustees and partners of the
Global Challenge Initiative on the Future of the Internet, of which this
2
workstream is a part, as well as the Initiative’s Co-Heads, Mark Spelman and
Alex Wong, and its Director, Danil Kerimi.
As a first-cut overview of the fragmentation landscape, this paper will help to
set a foundation for further analyses and action-oriented dialogues among FII
participants and within the international community at large. It was
commissioned for the explicit purpose of providing a more informed basis for
the identification and prioritization by all stakeholders of potential areas of
collaboration, including the definition of good practices or policy models that
can serve as a constructive example for others. A first step down this path will
be taken with the Annual Meeting 2016 session on Internet without Borders.
As the title of this session suggests, the Forum’s engagement in this issue
area is guided by a conviction that keeping the Internet as open and
interoperable as possible is essential if we are to sustain and expand its
capacities to promote global well-being in the years ahead.
Richard Samans
Member of the Managing Board
Geneva, January 2016